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12 Explaining the di vers ity  of  
resil ience in the cl imate change 
and security  discourse 
R e s i l i e n c e  i n  t r a n s l a t i o n 1 
Delf Ro the 
A b s t r a c t  
The concept of resilience has taken the hearts of Western practitioners and decision 
makers in development, environmental, or security policy by storm – or so it 
seems. In the looming “climate of complexity” produced by unfolding global 
warming, the idea of resilience, as the ability of systems and communities to au-
tonomously recover after shocks and to adapt to changing environmental condi-
tions, appears promising. Yet, different versions of resilience co-exist and compete 
with each other in diverse political arenas and fields of practice. As a result, resil-
ience resists any conceptual fixation – making it hard for policy-makers and prac-
titioners to agree upon a common definition of resilience. This essay seeks to ex-
plain the diversity of resilience by looking at processes of its “translation”. The 
translation of resilience here refers to both the transfer of the concept from one dis-
cursive field to another as well as the adoption and reinterpretation of resilience 
through actors in concrete resilience projects on the ground. 
KEYWORDS: Climate change, discourse, resilience, securitization, United King-
dom. 
                                                                          
1 An earlier version of this chapter has been published as Rothe, D., 2017: Climate Change and Security: From 
Paradigmatic Resilience to Resilience Multiple, Routledge Handbook of International Resilience: Policies, 
Theories and Practices, Chandler, D. and  J. Coaffe, eds., Routledge, 171–184. 
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I n t r o d u c t i o n  
Resilience – a concept with a long history in disciplines such as psychology or ecology 
– has recently made it to the desks of practitioners and policy-makers in policy fields 
including development cooperation, civil protection, or climate change adaptation. In 
the current “climate of complexity” (Rothe 2016), the promise of resilience, as a capacity 
to recover from shocks and to adapt to changing environmental conditions, appears 
promising. Yet, while everybody seems to talk (about) resilience, there is hardly any 
consent about the concrete meaning of resilience (Anderson 2015; Simon and Randalls 
2016). It remains controversial whether resilience is a property of infrastructure, a ca-
pacity of individual persons or collective entities, or a property of systems. Resilience 
may refer to a status (being resilient) as well as to a process (becoming resilient) to 
structures or individual actors (Bourbeau 2018). Furthermore, it is disputed whether 
resilience can be promoted and induced through external intervention or if only the 
systems or subjects themselves can enhance their own resilience (through processes of 
learning and self-adaptation). Finally, the normative evaluation of resilience in the lit-
erature differs considerably. Many commentators in critical IR understand resilience 
as a neoliberal form of security that would give up the liberal promise of protection and 
shifts the burden of protection from the state to vulnerable populations (Evans and 
Reid 2014; Joseph 2013b). For these authors, resilience represents a form of post-poli-
tics, in which “[t]he classic quest after the ‘good life’, once a starting point for both an 
art of living and the art of governing, is replaced by the more minimalist, almost real-
politik, striving for adaptive survival” (Vrasti and Michelsen 2017). Others argued in-
stead that resilience might represent a progressive alternative to traditional (national) 
accounts of security (Corry 2014). Certain forms of resilience might also work in coun-
ter-hegemonic ways – for example if understood as the resilience of oppositional 
groups to state repression – or as a vehicle for the transformation of ingrained social 
structures (Bourbeau and Ryan 2017). 
In short, resilience is everything else than a coherent or fixed program. Rather, it 
is a flexible concept that becomes translated as it moves between different discourses 
and policy areas (Grove 2013). In this chapter, I draw upon this observation to seek an-
swers to two related research questions: First, I seek to explain why resilience could 
recently become such a prominent political concept. Second, I shed some light on the 
ontology of resilience by exploring reasons for its heterogeneity. While scholars often 
acknowledge the ambiguity of resilience (e. g. Walker and Cooper 2011), it is seldom 
taken into account analytically (for an exception, see Simon and Randalls 2016). Advo-
cates as well as critics of resilience tend to present it as a rather coherent discourse or 
even a political paradigm, thereby blurring contradictions and fissures in the actual 
political practices of resilience. 
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In this contribution, I decidedly focus on the ambiguity of resilience and argue 
that it is exactly the concept’s capability of being easily translated from one policy field 
domain to another that (at least partially) explains the current political prominence of 
resilience. I establish this argument by tracing the translation of resilience as it travels 
between different sub-fields of the discourse on climate change related security risks 
(in the following climate security) in the United Kingdom (UK). The climate security 
discourse in the UK represents an extreme case to study the translation of resilience. 
Besides the USA, the UK is the country in which resilience produced the strongest res-
onance and found its way into all major strategic documents (Joseph 2013a). Thus, one 
should assume to find a rather coherent governmental take on resilience; and secondly, 
I will decidedly concentrate on governmental discourses and practices. 
The essay proceeds as follows. In the next section, I outline what I would call the 
paradigmatic approach to resilience. I develop an alternative to this paradigmatic ap-
proach drawing on Stephen Collier’s (2009) concept of topologies of power. In sec-
tion three, I turn to the empirical case study and start with tracing different story-
lines of climate security in the UK discourse. I show how each of these storylines 
draws upon a different understanding of resilience. This approach of studying the 
deep structure of resilience in the UK discourse is complemented by an analysis of 
resilience practices in the governance of climate-security risks. I study how resili-
ence becomes translated and reinterpreted by different actors in the climate security 
field. Finally, I argue that resilience emerges as a “floating signifier” (Laclau 2005; 
Laclau and Mouffe 1985) – a malleable concept that is flexible enough to bring to-
gether diverse practices of governing an insecure future in a complex governmental 
landscape of UK climate-resilience.2 
F r o m  p a r a d i g m a t i c  r e s i l i e n c e  t o  r e s i l i e n c e  a s  
t r a n s l a t i o n  
The existing International Relations (IR) literature on resilience often identifies the lat-
ter as a defining paradigm of the world-political present – clearly demarcated from 
earlier forms of security, which has recently become dominant in international poli-
tics. According to this reading, the rise of resilience would represent a clear break from 
earlier – liberal, modernist – forms of security. Resilience is rather understood as a 
                                                                          
2 In discourse theory, a floating signifier refers to a signifier that lacks a clear, unambiguous referent and thus 
means different things to different people. The semantically open nature of floating signifiers allows differ-
ent political projects to appropriate it and fill it with their own meaning. Examples in political discourse are 
sustainability or freedom. 
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single political discourse, ideology, or paradigm. I would call this understanding of re-
silience as a single political discourse, ideology, or paradigm a paradigmatic approach 
to resilience. The paradigmatic approach to resilience revolves around a set of assump-
tions that will be briefly summarized in the following paragraph3. First, the paradig-
matic approach stresses that resilience draws on a particular ontology of complexity 
(Chandler 2014). Deduced from complexity theory, adaptive systems thinking, and cy-
bernetics, resilience would problematize the possibility of non-linear change and the 
connectivity of coupled social-ecological systems. Translated into the field of security 
politics, resilience thus problematizes the threat of abrupt, unpredictable change re-
sulting from the complex interaction of globally interconnected networks (Kaufmann 
2013, 58). Second, authors in the critical IR literature have argued that resilience think-
ing dwells upon an epistemology of limited knowledge. In other words, policies that 
follow a rationale of resilience accept the inherent limit to prediction and forecasting 
in a world of complexity and radical contingency (Boas and Rothe 2016). Other than 
classical defense policy or disaster risk-management, resilience hence “does not imag-
ine specific scenarios against which defenses (or pre-emptive attacks) must be pre-
pared” (O’Malley 2011). Third, at the level of policy this leads to the acceptance that cer-
tain risks and dangers are ultimately inevitable (Zebrowski 2013). Hence, resilience 
would shift the focus of security policies from the prevention of external threats or 
risks to the inner vulnerabilities of populations, systems and individuals at risk (Chan-
dler 2013, 218). Fourth, a resilience paradigm is criticized for shifting the burden of se-
curity policy from the state to the vulnerables themselves, which are consequently 
made responsible for their own protection (Evans and Reid 2014). As a result, national 
and international security policies are increasingly modeled along the lines of a neolib-
eral (market-based) approach, which seeks to activate the self-help potential of vulner-
able populations (Joseph 2013b). Finally, such policies would require a particular type 
of institutional design based on flat hierarchies and connectivity – as paradigmatically 
expressed in the Anglo-Saxon notion of network governance (Rothe 2016). 
The works I have summarized under the label of a paradigmatic approach have 
provided valuable insights for our understanding of resilience as a political concept 
and its problems. In particular, these studies have highlighted the convergence of com-
plexity and neoliberal economic thinking and helped to make sense of a changing un-
derstanding of security and a related shift of responsibility from the state to society 
and the individual (Chandler 2013). Such an understanding of resilience as a mode of 
self-government under complexity is certainly important – for example, it undergirds 
many self-improvement manuals that have been quite successful in the mid-2000s 
                                                                          
3 Please note that I use the notion of paradigmatic resilience as analytical ideal type. I do not claim the follow-
ing list of resilience attributes to be exhaustive. Also, any single publication in the described fields does not 
necessarily draw upon all five assumptions on resilience.  
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(O’Malley 2011). However, as I argue in this paper, it represents only one understanding 
of resilience among many. Understanding resilience as a discourse or paradigm in sin-
gular bears the problem that inner contradictions and fissures of resilience practices 
are downplayed or overlooked (Brassett et al. 2013). 
Opposed to an understanding of resilience as a single historical paradigm, I 
would propose an understanding of resilience as a multiple (Simon and Randalls 
2016). Such an approach stresses that there is no single, coherent concept of resili-
ence. The notion of multiple resilience implies that there is more than one rationality 
or logic of resilience but less than many (Mol 1999). In other words, the meaning of 
resilience is ambiguous but not arbitrary4. I argue that the tendency to overlook am-
biguities and fissures in resilience thinking partly goes back to the prominence of 
Foucauldian governmentality approaches in the critical literature on resilience 
(Corry 2014). Instead of studying the discourses and practices of resilience in an open 
manner, critical scholars on resilience often rely upon a fixed notion of governmen-
tality as a particular neoliberal form of political power drawing on technologies of 
self-responsibilization and government at-the-distance (Bulley 2013; Joseph 2013b). 
As a result of this perspective, critical studies of resilience in the past thus too easily 
abandoned any understandings of resilience that do not fit the image of resilience as 
a neoliberal form of self-government (see Bourbeau 2018). 
As a way to avoid the harmonization-tendency inherent in governmentality ap-
proaches to resilience, I follow Stephen Collier to conceptualize the relation between 
power and knowledge as a complex topology of power. Collier starts from the obser-
vation that Michel Foucault in his later work turned away from his earlier interest in 
totalizing epochal analyses of power-knowledge formations (or governmentalities) 
to increasingly “examine how existing elements are taken up and recombined” (Col-
lier 2009). Although Foucault described the emergence of neoliberalism as an eco-
nomic and political rationality, he never saw neoliberalism as overarching rationality 
of government. In the words of Collier: 
One technology of power may provide guiding norms and an orienting telos. But 
it does not saturate all power relations. Rather, it suggests a configurational princi-
ple that determines how heterogeneous elements – techniques, institutional ar-
rangements, material forms and other technologies of power – are taken up and re-
combined (Collier 2009). 
For the present case, this implies that the concrete form and substance of resili-
ence is subject to a context-specific, (re-)combination of ideas and political practices: 
                                                                          
4 Olaf Corry has pointed to the existence of counter-hegemonic projects like the grassroots Transition Towns Move-
ment who have articulated a social-ecological notion of resilience that opposes the official neoliberal version of re-
silience by the UK government (Corry 2014, 263). While this is a valid point, I would even go beyond this argument 
and claim that ambiguity is an inherent feature of the official, governmental resilience discourse in the UK itself. 
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“the space of problematization is a topological space, and thinking is a driver of recom-
binatorial processes” (Collier 2009). A topological analysis of resilience thus seeks to 
map multiple versions of resilience and studies how resilience rationales and practices 
are constantly translated, reinterpreted, and recombined in different contexts. Rather 
than as a new paradigm of governance, resilience should thus be understood as a con-
figurational principle, which allows for a reconfiguration and translation of already ex-
isting political programs, ideas, and policies. 
In contrast to earlier discourse analyses of resilience, I move from a diachronic to 
a synchronic perspective5. On the one hand, the sample of empirical sources comprises 
conceptual defense and security documents: the National Security Strategies (NSS) 
from 2008, 2009, and 2010 and the Strategic Defense Review (SDR) 2010. On the other 
hand, the sample includes concrete policy documents on the implementation of cli-
mate change and security related policies of the Ministry of Defense (MoD), the For-
eign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the Department for International Develop-
ment (DfID), think-tank reports, and NGO publications from the period 2006–2014. 
Additionally, 12 expert interviews have been conducted with representatives of key in-
stitutions in the three fields. In a first methodological step, I looked at the deep struc-
ture of the resilience discourse in the UK. Here, I was not so much interested in the 
actual discursive struggles (that is what is being said about resilience by whom) but in 
the question of how competing understandings of resilience are framed through col-
lective symbols including metaphors, iconic symbols, analogies, and tropes such as 
metonymy, pars-pro-toto, or catachresis (Hajer 2006). I traced how these collective 
symbols become condensed into competing storylines. In a second methodological 
step, I turned away from this discursive deep structure to governmental programs and 
practices. I studied how resilience becomes implemented, practiced, or enacted in dif-
ferent institutional contexts. To theorize resilience in a way that accounts for its heter-
ogeneity, I finally distinguished between three privileged translations of resilience. 
The analysis was operationalized with the qualitative data analysis software MAXQDA. 
T h e  U K  c l i m a t e  s e c u r i t y  d i s c o u r s e  
Already in 1980s, different voices in academic in political discourse raised concerns 
over the possible security implications of global environmental change. The UK played 
a crucial role in the emergence of this discourse early on (Rothe 2016). For example, as 
early as in the late 1980s then-Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher called climate change 
                                                                          
5 That is from a conceptual history or genealogy of resilience thinking towards the study of the multiple mean-
ings of resilience in present discourses. 
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a major threat to humanity and warned that “it is life itself that we must battle to pre-
serve” (Carvalho and Burgess 2005). However, articulations like these remained occa-
sional and in the 1990s public interest in the problem of global warming dropped – and 
so did worries about its security implications. In the mid-2000s, however, spurred by 
a series of disasters like the severe flooding in the UK in 2000 or the 2003 heatwave that 
killed tens of thousands across Europe, climate security returned to the agenda of high 
politics (Rothe 2016). Policymakers such as Tony Blair or then-Foreign Minister Mar-
garet Beckett promoted the storyline of climate change as a threat to international se-
curity, in part as a strategy to re-establish the UK as a major international power (Car-
valho and Burgess 2005). In 2007, the UN Security Council discussed the issue of cli-
mate change for the first time in its history – on the initiative of the UK Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office (FCO). At that time, there was broad consent amongst govern-
ment officials, strategic think tanks, NGOs, the media, as well as bureaucrats from dif-
ferent UK departments about the security risks of climate change for the UK. By the 
late 2000s, these different actors increasingly took up the concept of resilience as a way 
of addressing the security implications of climate change. Resilience soon became one 
of the most prominent concepts in the discourse (Boas and Rothe 2016). 
However, by taking a closer look at the discourse on climate security in the UK, 
one can observe that the latter is anything but a coherent, consensual debate. While 
all mentioned actors share a common orientation towards the potential security im-
plications of climate change, they articulate the climate-security link in quite differ-
ent ways. In doing so, they draw upon competing understandings of resilience. In 
the following, I distinguish three competing strands within the climate security dis-
course, each of which uses resilience in a considerably different way. 
C l i m a t e  r i s k  a n d  t r a d i t i o n a l  s e c u r i t y  
A first, influential strand of the UK climate security discourse frames climate change 
as a threat or risk to the national security of the UK (Cabinet Office 2008). Voices falling 
in this category commonly express concerns over two types of risks for the UK that 
emerge from climate change (Cabinet Office 2009). First, primary risks are those po-
tential harms for the UK that directly result from global warming, for example, a rising 
risk of flooding due to sea level rise or an increasing probability of dangerous heat-
waves. Secondary risks, on the contrary, refer to the possibility that climate change 
could exacerbate tensions in other parts of the world, which might then affect the UK 
indirectly through an increase of irregular migration or the spread of instability. Of 
crucial importance in this threat narrative is the historical self-understanding of the 
UK as an island and a major marine power (Cabinet Office 2009). On the one hand, this 
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self-image implies that the UK faces particular vulnerabilities both because it is sur-
rounded by water and because it is globally interconnected – and hence particularly 
threatened by instabilities overseas. Many actors from the development and security 
field, including think tanks and DfID and FCO bureaucrats, are not so much concerned 
with the direct impacts of climate change but with the “consequences of consequences” 
(Smith and Vivekananda 2007). Such actors paint a picture of an increasingly danger-
ous environment for the UK in a warming world. This picture is then linked to the idea 
that the UK is a global hub in a globally networked world. As a result, it is feared that 
“it will be difficult for the UK to isolate itself from the global economic and geopolitical 
shocks that look certain to be experienced in a warming world” (Government Office for 
Science 2011). The focus on the consequences of consequences thus makes the vulner-
ability of the “global South” against climate change – and especially in the UK overseas 
territories and former colonies with which it still holds close ties – an immediate con-
cern for the UK. 
To cope with the primary and secondary risks posed by climate change, the UK 
has implemented a comprehensive climate impacts strategy that includes for exam-
ple periodically conducted national climate risk-assessments (Defra 2012). These risk 
assessments provide the necessary information for the implementation of the UK’s 
National Adaptation Program (NAP). The executive summary of the 2012 National 
Climate Risk Assessment report argues: 
Although we do not know the likelihood future changes in the UK’s climate, we know 
enough to present a range of possible outcomes, which can be used to inform adaptation 
planning. For this purpose potential climate risks to the UK have been categorized ac-
cording to their magnitude, ‘confidence’ and the ‘urgency for action’ (Defra 2012, xi). 
Unlike the paradigmatic approach to resilience outline above, resilience here does not 
imply an end of the attempt to calculate and predict future risks at all. Quite the con-
trary, the compilation of all sorts of potential climate risks to the UK in comprehensive 
“risk registers” here becomes the basis of a climate resilient UK. This intimate relation 
between risk calculation and resilience is perfectly expressed by the Secretary of State 
for Environment, Owen Paterson, in his introduction to the 2013 NAP Report “Making 
the country resilient to a changing climate”(Defra 2013). In this report he argues that 
[…] Britain’s expertise in areas such as weather forecasting, flood modelling, infrastruc-
ture and insurance are already coming to the fore to prepare us for the kinds of events we 
might see more often. Indeed, the UK is already one of the global leaders in this industry 
of the future (Defra 2013, 1, emphasis added). 
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To sum up, climate conflict and risk storylines, first of all, identify linear causalities 
between climatic changes and (direct as well as indirect) security risks for the UK. 
These storylines focus on risks at a particular point of time in the future (e. g. the UK 
in 2030, 2050, or 2070) and seek to render them present through risk assessment of 
an expanding UK “industry of the future”. In this reading, the UK’s “industry of the 
future” and the foresight products that it provides become a crucial source of climate 
resilience. However, the anticipation of future climate risks and related knowledge 
practices are complicated by methodological and epistemological uncertainties, i. e. 
the uncertainty about the right methods to calculate future developments. Resilience 
thus becomes a function of predictive capacities and becomes embedded within a 
broader anticipatory governance of climate risks. 
C l i m a t e  c a t a s t r o p h e  
A second strand in the UK climate security discourse (re)presents climate change as 
a looming global catastrophe (Methmann and Rothe 2012). These articulations of the 
climate security relationship differ from a classical understanding of security and 
the logic of risk outlined above with respect to the temporality and spatiality of the 
constructed threat. Temporally, the notion of climate catastrophe draws upon the 
idea of a movement towards a final endpoint – that is a global ecological collapse 
(Aradau and van Munster 2011, 10). This idea of a linear, teleological movement is for 
example expressed through the notion of the tipping point. A tipping point repre-
sents a temporal boundary, beyond which the gradual, linear change of a system 
(such as the global climate system) becomes non-linear and irreversible: 
Many assume that climate change will be a slow, linear process toward a moderately 
warmer future. However, scientists agree there are likely to be elements of the climate 
system that function like light switches – rapidly changing to a qualitatively different 
state (Mabey 2011, 16). 
Sometimes the catastrophe is even elevated through apocalyptic or religious symbols 
(Methmann and Rothe 2012, Skrimshire 2014). Spatially, such representations of cli-
mate change turn away from the UK as central reference object and instead frame cli-
mate change as a fundamental threat to whole humanity or the planet as such. Thus, 
the catastrophe here poses a universal threat, an absolute endpoint both in temporal 
and in spatial terms. Spatially, the focus of security shifts from the national to the in-
ternational or global level (see Foresight 2011b). Temporally, the notion of catastrophe 
puts a strong focus on mitigation: the catastrophe – in this case dangerous climate 
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change – has to be prevented at any cost. This strand of the climate security discourse 
hence calls for strong leadership and political steering from decision makers. In the 
case of climate security, such a call for sovereign action is often articulated by Earth 
System Scientists and the notion of planetary boundaries (Steffen et al. 2015, see also 
Hardt 2018). However, this capability of the political sovereign to meet this role as 
leader in climate mitigation is limited both by the global nature of the threat and the 
epistemological uncertainties inherent to the scientific capacity to detect and predict 
tipping points of a complex and interlinked Earth System (Steffen et al. 2018). 
To sum up, a discourse of climate catastrophe draws upon an ecological teleol-
ogy: the development towards an endpoint (non-linear climate change), which must 
be prevented at any cost. At the same time, there are epistemological limits to the 
detection of existing tipping points in the Earth system (Mayer 2012, 171). Mitigating 
the catastrophe requires an active engagement with the environment – here inter-
national climate governance – to shape a desired future and prevent dangerous 
pathways of climate change, for example, by building resilience overseas. 
C l i m a t e  c o m p l e x i t y  
A third strand of climate security discourse understands climate change as a complex 
and unpredictable phenomenon. According to this rationale, there are not only 
methodological and epistemological but also ontological limits to knowing climate 
change. The UK national security strategy from 2013 is a good case in point, which 
starts from the assumption that we are now living in an “age of uncertainty” (Cabinet 
Office 2010b, 3). Global climate change is considered as one major source behind the 
rising global uncertainty, which nowadays shapes the UK security environment. Il-
lustrative is a MoD report that presents climate change as a “ring road issue”. A ring 
road issue is understood as “a driver that is so pervasive in nature and influence that 
it will affect the life of everyone on the planet over the next 30 years” (Cabinet Office 
2010a, 6). Climate change is not only perceived as a global threat (as in the discourse 
of climate catastrophe) or as a trend that poses a series of direct and indirect risks to 
the UK, but increasingly also as a complex system whose secondary impacts are lit-
erally unpredictable. 
What is striking in the UK security strategy and related security documents is the 
emerging resonance between climate research and security thinking. Climate systems 
research has informed notions of complexity, which led to a rethinking in current se-
curity policy (Kavalski 2011, Mayer 2012). Furthermore, strategic thinkers and security 
officials have articulated climate change itself as a complex security threat: “The cli-
mate is a complex system and most forms of human interaction exist in the realm of 
complexity. […] Ultimately, complexity itself is a significant risk factor that needs to be 
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addressed explicitly” (Mabey 2011, 91). In the UK security discourse, the belief that we 
are living in an age of uncertainty went hand in hand with a shift away from classical 
security policies that seek stability and control. Following the slogan “stationarity is 
dead”, the British think tank E3G for example argues, “[p]reparing for the future 
means rejecting stationarity as a guide to future outcomes. The first presumption 
should therefore be that all critical systems will be vulnerable without adaptive 
measures” (Mabey 2011, 103). In this reading, protective security policies must be as 
versatile as the perceived threats: “In an age of uncertainty, we need to be able to act 
quickly and effectively” (Cabinet Office 2010b, 5). As a result, the complexity discourse 
fuels skepticism towards centrally planned political steering. Hence, in line with the 
critical literature on resilience, climate complexity storylines promote forms of decen-
tralized governance that shift the burden of security policy from the state to the indi-
vidual citizen, to local communities, or to the private market (Cabinet Office 2008, 59). 
In sum, a discourse of climate complexity stresses the uncontrollability and rad-
ical uncertainty of the climate system. In short, in an age of uncertainty, the past 
does not provide any yardstick anymore to predict future events and trends. Thus, 
knowing or actively shaping future developments is beyond the scope of human ac-
tors. Contingency is not considered a feature of the representation of the world an-
ymore but a feature of the world itself. 
A r t i c u l a t i o n s  of  c l i m a t e  r e s i l i e n c e  i n  t h e  U K  
d i s c o u r s e  
In this section, I present the findings of a comprehensive discourse analysis of key 
policy documents and think-tank reports in three political fields crucially related to 
the climate change and security discourse: the strategic community, the field of civil 
protection, and development and foreign policy. Additionally, 12 research interviews 
with representatives were conducted6. The aim of the analysis was to show how link-
ages between climate change and security – and with it the concept of resilience – 
become rearticulated and translated by practitioners and political representatives in 
different fields. The results of this discourse analysis are summarized in Figure 1. 
The figure shows the most prominent discursive concepts, or signifiers, in different 
domains. The size of each concept illustrates its relative prominence in each context 
while its position on the map and the proximity to neighboring signifiers represents 
its relation to other concepts in the discourse. The map was derived from a compre-
hensive discourse analysis of the empirical material with MAXQDA. It does not rep-
resent a semantic network based on a quantitative or bibliometric analysis. Figure 1 
                                                                          
6 For a further discussion of the underlying methodology, see next section as well as Rothe 2016. 
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gives an overview of the complex landscape of climate security in the UK. It presents 
the key demands, concepts, and practices that are linked to resilience in three differ-
ent contexts: 1. the strategic community, i. e. actors from the MoD as well as secu-
rity-related think tanks, 2. civil protection and climate change adaptation; and 3. de-
velopment and foreign policy7. These demands, concepts, and ideas are legitimized 
through the identification of a whole range of potential problems, risks and threats 
(upper part of the figure). These are presented as external, antagonistic threats for 
the inside community of the UK.  
For practitioners and officials in the strategic community, climate security is 
mainly a function of the resilience of the defense estate against unfolding climate haz-
ards. Resilience promotion is based on all sorts risk assessment and “horizon scanning” 
activities (Cabinet Office 2009, 44). Thus, resilience is basically about the generation of 
knowledge about vulnerabilities and ways to overcome them. For example, the UK 
Ministry of Defense expresses the hope that research on (low-carbon) technologies in 
the military will increase the resilience of the defense estate under the premise of fu-
ture climate change (MoD 2010b). The need for research and the promotion of fore-
casting technologies is mainly justified through the storylines of an impending climate 
catastrophe and the complexity of the earth system outlined above, which stress the 
existence of tipping points and uncertainties about future climatic changes. 
In the context of civil protection and adaptation (center of Figure 1), resilience is 
mainly articulated in line with the demand for enhancing adaptive capacities of local 
communities and individuals. In this context, resilience requires a “multi-level, 
                                                                          
7 Figure 1 is based on a qualitative analysis of the UK climate security discourse. 
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multi sector, bottom-up approach” (Cabinet Office 2009, 90) that would integrate 
self-responsible communities, businesses, and individuals into UK climate disaster 
management. In line with the UK’s broader “Big Society” agenda (Cabinet Office 
2010a, 49), private actors are supposed to become active self-reliant agents that do 
their bit in the creation of a resilient UK. The overall rationale of the NAP – that is “a 
society which makes timely, far-sighted and well-informed decisions to address the 
risks and opportunities posed by a changing climate” (Defra 2013, 9) – perfectly ex-
presses this rationale. Demands for preparedness and self-responsibility are based 
on storylines of climate risk. 
On the right side of the figure, you find expressions of climate security and resili-
ence in the field of development and foreign policy. Actors from the Department for 
International Development (DfID) or the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), as 
well as peacekeeping NGOs have linked climate security to notions of good govern-
ance, functioning state structures, and to the principle of sustainable development 
(Smith and Vivekananda 2007, Smith and Vivekananda 2009). For these actors resili-
ence in the “Global South” is a key concept to produce climate security. In this context, 
it refers to adaptation funding that includes private sector investments in developing 
countries as well as Official Development Assistance (ODA) to educate and activate vul-
nerable communities in the global South. These policies and demands are legitimized 
against the backdrop of climate conflict and risk storylines that highlight mainly the 
secondary impacts of climate change. The dangerous “other” is made up by the global 
South and its problems with fragility, instability, ongoing conflict, and migration. 
T h r e e  t r a n s l a t i o n s  of  r e s i l i e n c e  
The different versions of the UK climate security discourse did not simply translate 
into a clear set of policy measures and governmental programs. As I show in this sec-
tion of the paper, when bureaucrats and practitioners in the policy fields of develop-
ment, security or civil protection, adopt climate security storylines, they rearticulate 
and reinterpret them against the backdrop of their own established routines, con-
ventions, and beliefs. As a result, there is nothing like a single coherent UK climate 
security strategy. Rather, one can observe the emergence of a complex governmental 
landscape of climate security – a creative amalgamation of heterogeneous political 
ideas, instruments, and practices. The malleable concept of resilience provides some 
orientation for all these practices without subsuming them under an overarching po-
litical rationality. Exactly because resilience is so malleable and ambiguous, it be-
comes possible for actors from very different contexts and backgrounds to translate 
it into their own language and mindsets. At the same time, however, its meaning is 
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not completely arbitrary. Drawing upon a typology of types of governing the future 
by Anderson (2010), I suggest that it is possible to distinguish between three ideal-
typical translations of resilience that each follows a distinct logic of security: precau-
tion, preemption, and preparedness (see Figure 2). I use Anderson’s typology to de-
rive three analytical ideal types that help structuring the complex landscape of the 
climate security discourse in the UK.  
A first translation of climate resilience is one of prevention. Hereby, I refer to 
the attempts of security actors, governmental scientists (Government Office for Sci-
ence 2011b), strategic think tanks (DCDC 2010, DCDC 2014), and NGOs (Mabey 2011) 
in the UK strategic community to anticipate or calculate future climate change re-
lated risks. The cooperation and interaction of these actors in workshops, meetings, 
and joint projects leads to the growing convergence of methods and practices be-
tween climate sciences on the one hand and security policy on the other. The cur-
rency of resilience understood as prevention is knowledge, which circulates between 
the described actors in the form of risk registers, future scenarios, or risk matrixes 
(MoD 2010a). Scholars and think tank members produce this future knowledge 
through a whole range of monitoring, risk assessment activities, and “horizon scan-
ning” activities (Cabinet Office 2009, 44).  
A good case in point to demonstrate how the logic of resilience as prevention 
works in practice is the MoD’s Climate Impact Risk Assessment Method (MoD 2010b). 
The aim of this approach was to preserve UK’s defense capabilities by increasing its 
resilience to “[…] the risks to global security presented by the complex geopolitical in-
teractions resulting from a changing climate, as well as the risk to our own establish-
ments and equipment from the impacts of climate change” (MoD 2010b, 2). For this, 

















































































 Explaining the diversity of resilience in the climate change and security discourse 223 
 
the UK MoD compiled a comprehensive “Climate Resilience Risk Register” (MoD 
2010b, 5) that lists, prioritizes, and scores any current climatic risk for MoD’s defense 
estate or infrastructure. In a second step, the MoD combines this risk register with the 
scenarios developed in the UK Climate Projections 2009. Whereas the paradigmatic 
approach to resilience outlined above understands the rise of resilience as a reaction to 
the apparent failure of conventional risk-management methods due to the limits of 
knowledge in a world of complexity, the example of the MoD proves that the opposite 
is the case in the strategic community. Comprehensive knowledge of future risks is 
seen as the prerequisite of resilience. As put by members of the UK think tank Interna-
tional Alert, a resilient society “[…] understands the risks it faces because it has the sci-
entific capacities to do so” (Smith and Vivekananda 2007, 33). Consequently, resilience 
becomes translated into a liberal-modernist discourse, which stresses the role of tech-
nology and science for human progress. 
In a second institutional context – that of civil protection and climate adaptation 
– resilience becomes translated into a discourse of preparedness (Chandler 2014, 56–
57). Actors working in this field link resilience to their established routines, conven-
tions, and practices; thereby tearing down departmental dividing lines (Adey and An-
derson 2012). The overall rationale is to empower and include local stakeholders and to 
remove the barriers, which are faced by the institutions of the state in an “Age of Com-
plexity” (Cabinet Office, 2010a, 2010b). Following the ideal of a “multi-level, multi sec-
tor, bottom-up approach to resilience planning” (Cabinet Office 2009, 90), state actors 
seek to incorporate programs to integrate businesses, communities, and individuals 
into climate adaptation and disaster preparedness activities. The rationale behind this 
is that these actors would be “better placed than government to understand and re-
spond to the needs of the local community before, during, and after an emergency” 
(Cabinet Office 2010a, 26). For example, the establishment of “Local Resilience Fo-
rums” seeks to initiate a continuous dialogue between local citizens and stakeholders 
as well as regional administrations and the civil contingencies secretariat on a regular 
basis (Adey and Anderson 2012, 108). Resilience here transcends popular distinctions 
between interventionist centrally planned and decentralized market-based forms of 
governance by integrating public and private actors. The work on preparedness, to 
sum up, links the practices of very different actors – from disaster planners to private 
sector consultancies, to businesses, and to communities. It helps establishing novel 
relations between actors and circulates tasks and responsibilities between them. 
A final translation of resilience in the climate security landscape adheres to a logic 
of preemption. In the field of foreign and development policy, resilience mainly follows 
the aim of mitigating secondary risks from climate change for the UK. In line with a 
logic of preemption, actors from the DfID and the FCO actively intervene in the UK’s 
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international environment to shape a desired future through diplomacy and develop-
ment policy. This is perfectly expressed by the notion of an “active diplomacy” (FCO 
2006), which builds upon the assumption that: 
What happens abroad has never mattered more for our security and prosperity. 
In an age of rapid global change, the task for Government is to seek to understand 
and influence the world for the benefit of our people (Blair quoted in FCO 2006, 3). 
The UK’s active diplomacy seeks to mobilize the international community to join 
the UK’s ambitious climate mitigation efforts. For example, the UK sponsored debates 
on climate change in the UN Security Council followed this rationale – that is to raise 
awareness and to activate the most affected countries (Government Office for Science 
2011b, 90). At the same time, UK development policy becomes increasingly reoriented 
towards support of climate change adaptation and resilience building efforts in devel-
oping countries. DfID and related NGOs seek empowering local stakeholders and 
communities in vulnerable regions. The rationale is that increasing the resilience of 
overseas communities will prevent perceived risks for the UK— such as an increased 
influx of migrants due to climate change (DfID, FCO and MoD 2011a). A good example 
is the UK International Climate Fund, established in 2010, which has the aim of fund-
ing adaptation and mitigation projects in vulnerable countries and regions (DfID, FCO 
and MoD 2011b). Climate funding here becomes reframed as investment in resilience 
and an instrument to produce stability abroad (DfID et al. 2011a). Another good exam-
ple of how resilience becomes translated into development policy in line with a logic of 
preemption is the UK strategy to deal with climate-induced migration. The seminal 
UK Foresight report on “Migration and Global Environmental Change” (Government 
Office for Science 2011a), for example, argues for proactively promoting planned mi-
gration and resettlements in climate hot-spot regions. The underlying logic is that 
planned migration could be used to preempt uncontrolled and unplanned migration 
flows from vulnerable regions that might reach the UK (see Government Office for Sci-
ence 2011a, 17). Other than suggested by the paradigmatic approach to resilience out-
lined above, the latter here does not imply the end of interventionism, political steer-
ing, and planning. Instead, investment in resilience becomes a possibility for govern-
ment intervention in the world in spite of complexity and uncertainty. Resilience be-
comes translated into a liberal-modernist discourse with aim of intervening and shap-
ing the world. Rather than autonomous, self-organizing systems, it addresses political 
subjects that can be influenced, activated, and shaped. 
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C o n c l u s i o n :  R e s i l i e n c e  i n  t r a n s l a t i o n  
As I have shown in this essay, resilience has been translated and reinterpreted by mul-
tiple actors in different contexts of the UK’s governmental strategy to address danger-
ous climate change. My study shows that resilience is characterized by a multiplicity 
and ambiguity that allows resilience to function as a boundary concept that bridges 
different political communities. Drawing on a topological understanding of power, I 
was able to sketch a more differentiated picture of the climate resilience landscape in 
the UK. In this heterogeneous landscape, resilience managed to become a dominant 
political concept, not despite but due to its ambiguity. Exactly because resilience can 
be translated in very different contexts and because it allows actors in these contexts to 
reinterpret resilience in relation to their established routines and conventions, resili-
ence could become a hegemonic demand in UK the climate security field. For some, it 
resonates with a neoliberal – or better post-liberal – complexity discourse and mistrust 
in central government. At the same time, however, it easily adopts and integrates dia-
metrically different voices and re-interpretations of resilience (Boas and Rothe 2016). 
Resilience assembles political actors in a spontaneous and disordered way and links 
heterogeneous sets of practices and ideas in temporary networks and assemblages. It 
does so without following any broader political ideological or strategy. I would argue 
that it is exactly this ability of resilience to forge temporary assemblages rather than 
stable discourse coalitions or political communities, which makes up the strength of 
resilience in our age. The UK certainly represents an extreme case given the ubiquity 
and the popularity of resilience in the political and public discourse. Thus, the question 
arises whether the findings of this study are generalizable beyond the context of the 
UK. Further research is required to give a definite answer to this question. 
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